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SECTION III: FIRST PHILOSOPHY
“Being” (τὸ ὄν) as Said of Predicates 
in the Critical Text of Aristotle, Metaphysics Lambda
Silvia Fazzo, ITALY
PART 1: ONTOLOGY
 In Aristotle’s times, Greek grammar was not yet 
established and canonized as a system. Aristotle 
could still deal with the syntax of the Greek verb 
“to be” and of the relevant participle, “being” (ὤν, 
οὖσα, ὄν), as an open field for research. Indeed, 
the theoretical relevance of thinking about “be-
ing” as such had become a topos in philosophical 
literature since Parmenides and Plato; however, 
Aristotle could not yet make a fully coherent sys-
tem out of it and its various agreements with 
nouns. 
 Apparently a kind of failure in agreement be-
tween words, the alleged passages indirectly testify 
for Aristotle’s effort on this path, and in language 
analysis as a relevant tool. This sheds some light, 
albeit indirectly, upon his leading interests when 
he conceived the books which we now call the 
Metaphysics.
1.  An Issue at Stake, Concerning 
the Method of Aristotle’s Ontology
Scholarly tradition in modern times has been han-
dling Aristotle as an eclectic, curious, clever man 
no doubt, but also a pedant one after all. Since the 
XIX century, such an image is too easily contrasted 
with Plato’s. If Plato shines as a kind of a pre-Kan-
tian genius for his intuition about a hopeless gap 
between human perception and the deepest reality 
of things, Aristotle is assigned a laborious empiri-
cism. None denies the subtlety of his analytical 
skills; but his attitude has appeared sometimes too 
naive, because of the alleged absence of a reflec-
Introduction
In this paper, I will be focusing on seeming anom-
alies in the use of the verb “to be,” as found in sev-
eral passages in Metaphysics Lambda, once it is 
restored in a critical edition. At least a couple of 
times (4. 1070b25 and 7. 1072a25f.), instead of the 
standard subject agreement, the participle “being” 
shows agreement with the predicate noun. Such a 
peculiar feature is clearly attested in the most an-
cient textual witnesses, but was corrected in later 
Byzantine manuscripts and regarded as scribal 
mistakes by editors in the 19th and 20th century. 
In fact, the matter deserves close scrutiny, since it 
seems to be justified by Aristotle’s introductory 
statement at Lambda 1. 1069a25 (here in exergo): 
predicate nouns (which typically include not self-
subsisting ones, e.g., “not-white”) are, in a sense, 
“beings.” No previous editor or translator seems to 
have paid attention to such a peculiar feature, 
which definitely calls for an explanation. Given 
this lack of previous literature, I am putting for-
ward a first, and no doubt provisional, attempt to 
make sense of it, based on the Greek text of Meta-
physics strengthened by Aubenque’s relevant re-
marks. In my view, such occurrences of “to be,” a 
concept that Aristotle expresses through the parti-
cipial form (τὸ ὄν), testify for the very same inter-
est in language analysis which lays at the origin of 
the much-debated theory of the “being qua being.” 
According to my proposed reconstruction, this 
theory, which emerges in the central books of the 
Metaphysics, is then summarized, and further de-
veloped, in book Lambda, but not entirely final-
ized, either there or anywhere else in the corpus. 
λέγομεν γοῦν εἶναι καὶ 
ταῦτα, οἷον ἔστιν 
οὐ λευκόν (Lambda 1. 1069a25)
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mined.3 It is often taken as a direct, albeit conceptu-
alized expression of what reality is.4 Accordingly, 
being qua being (τὸ ὂν ᾗ ὄν), whose focal meaning 
substance is established to be in the Metaphysics, 
tends to be taken, dialectically or not, as some kind 
of comprehensive being existing in itself. By the 
way, this understanding of being as existent presup-
poses that Aristotle’s “being,” as a verbal noun, re-
fers to the subject of the relevant verb to be, just as 
it happens in modern languages as well. We shall 
see that this does not need to be always true.
 Such a reading of being as existent is not without 
connection with the widely spread image of an em-
pirical Aristotle, which, while being correct in a 
sense, is only a part of what can be said of Aristotle’s 
theoretical philosophy which is largely based on 
analytical methods of research. Moreover, one has 
to take into account the general framework. When 
the verb to be is concerned, the context is given by 
the use of the verb “to be” in Greek. In the latest 
decades, the Greek verb to be has been put in the 
middle by Kahn and by others. Similarities and dif-
ferences with modern languages have built a whole 
field for research. The existential use of the verb “to 
be,” if there is one, is proper of its absolute or “com-
plete” use, as opposed to the “incomplete” use, i.e., 
as a copula. This is why if “being” means “existent,” 
not only “being” must refer to the subject of the 
verb “to be,” but this has to be used absolutely, i.e., 
in a complete sense, as opposed to the copula, which 
needs to be completed by a predicate.
 As it is well known, and we are about to recall it, 
Aristotle was sometimes in condition to contrast a 
complete vs. an incomplete use of the verb “to be.” 
How far could he make a system of the different 
uses of the participle of the verb to be (τὸ ὄν) as 
referred to its incomplete use, is nonetheless a part-
ly open question. This is due not only to the differ-
ent role to be can play in a different context, but to 
a larger issue concerning the difference in role be-
tween subject and predicate once the two are con-
nected by the verb to be as a copula. It is not obvi-
3.  The idea occurs in A. Laks, “Metaphysics Λ 7,” in Aristo-
tle’s Metaphysics Lambda, Symposium Aristotelicum, eds. M. 
Frede and D. Charles (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), 207–
243.
4.  See discussion and bibliography in F. Leight, “The Cop-
ula and Semantic Continuity in Plato’s Sophist,” Oxford Stud-
ies in Ancient Philosophy 34 (2008): 105-122.
tion of what the reality will be beyond what men 
perceive and communicate with one another.1
 Only about half a century ago Wolfgang Wieland 
has debunked the idea, indeed unlikely, that Aristo-
tle found his doctrine of the four causes of natural 
phenomena looking straightforwardly at nature, 
and has shown that this doctrine is made of the 
analysis of the different ways Greek speakers answer 
to the basic question “why” (διὰ τί). He regards the 
four Aristotelian causes without hesitation as Re-
flexion Begriffe, “in a Kantian sense”—he adds.2
 Wieland’s discovery, if one allows it to be one 
(as I do), while being often accepted concerning 
the theory of the four causes in the Physics, did not 
significantly affect the current understanding of 
the Metaphysics, even not of those sections of it 
which are drawing from the Physics, being con-
cerned with the theory. 
 Hence the question: what is the consequence for 
our understanding of the Metaphysics, if one con-
siders that the foundations of Aristotle’s relevant 
theories lay not in the direct observation of natu-
ral phenomena but in the analysis of the way natu-
ral phenomena are spoken of and explained? It 
seems to me that this still allows for further in-
quiry, especially when the central theory of being 
is concerned. 
 Aristotle’s theory of being in the Metaphysics 
clearly focuses on substance (οὐσία). Substance 
(οὐσία) is there regarded as a focal meaning of be-
ing (τὸ ὄν): this is clearly stated and argued for, pas-
sim in the corpus and especially in Metaphysics Zeta 
1-2 and in Lambda 1. However, the way “substance” 
has to be taken, far from being clear in itself, is 
largely undetermined, or, as some say, underdeter-
1.  See e.g., E. Benveniste [“Catégories de la langue, catégo-
ries de la pensée,” in Problèmes de linguistique générale (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1966)], with P. Aubenque’s reaction [“Aristote et le 
langage,” Annales de la Faculté des Lettres d’Aix 43 (1967): 85-
105, “Appendice”]). I am grateful to dr. Vittorio Bonzi and to 
Francesco Borsatti for their useful remarks. The present re-
search was developed during my grant at Università della Ca-
labria, LISE Departiment, 2016/2017.
2.  See Wolfgang Wieland, Die aristotelische Physik: Unter-
suchungen über die Grundlegung der Naturwissenschaft und 
die sprachlichen Bedingungen der Prinzienpforschung bei Aris-
toteles (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1962), 89ff. 
See, moreover, 187, 202ff., 261, 337; Id., “Aristotle’s Physics 
and the Problem of Inquiry into Principle,” in Articles on Ar-
istotle. 1: Science, eds. M. Schofield et al. (London: Duck-
worth, 1975), 135ff. 
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and Sophistici elenchi6 as it is well known from 
standard reference works.7
 This, therefore, one may assume, shows that Ar-
istotle does distinguish as such the copulative use 
of ὄν, or, at least, the way the ὄν is used to describe 
how and what the subject is (the τί ἐστι).
 From this perspective, the question whether Ar-
istotle recognizes the copula as such would appear 
to be settled from the outset.
 Still, it has been argued that it is unsafe to su-
perpose to ancient standard Greek or even to phil-
osophical Greek our distinction between a com-
plete and a non complete use of the verb “to be,” as 
codified in modern grammars. The problem needs 
to be considered anew.
 I will put forward the following hypotheses: 
–  Aristotle is aware of the importance of the dis-
tinction, as the aforementioned loci show; 
–  He is especially interested in the copulative use, 
i.e., to the power the verb “to be” has when con-
nected, on the one side to the subject, on the 
other, to the predicate. 
–  One could say therefore that Aristotle, when 
dealing with being qua being sought for grammar 
(in our terms), and for syntax especially.8 
6.  Arist. Soph. El. 5. 167a1-2 (as a sample of a fallacious infer-
ence): “as if one were to assume, for instance, that since what is 
not is thought about, what is not is. For it is not the same thing 
to be something and to be simpliciter.” Trans. W.A. Pickard-
Cambridge, in The Works of Aristotle, Translated into English 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1928). Such passages are well 
known from standard reference works, such as Lesley Brown’s 
seminal article, see the following note. See also Ch. Kahn, The 
Verb “Be” in Ancient Greek (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2003).
7.  See L. Brown, “The Verb ‘To Be’ in Greek Philosophy,” 
in Language, ed. Stephen Everson (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994), 212-236, in part. 233-236; this is a 
starting point whose conclusion one could slightly diverge 
from, see in particular her p. 234: “In general Aristotle be-
lieves (I think) that the inference from ‘X is F’ to ‘X is’ is a 
perfectly safe one (just like that from ‘Jane teaches French’ to 
‘Jane teaches’) but that for some values of F (being thought 
about, being dead) the inference is unsafe, but the blame, as if 
were, lies on the particular value of F, not on the move from 
one meaning of ‘is’ to another.”
8.  In this sense, Aristotle could hardly be satisfied by the 
γραμματικὴ τέχνη of his time, which was a mere writing tech-
nique. Indeed, this technique was not without charm on Aristo-
tle as on Plato. One was struck by the mysterious relationship 
between the elements and the compound, and especially by the 
radical otherness of the compound with the mere sum of addi-
tional elements. See F. Ildefonse, La naissance de la grammaire 
dans l’antiquité Grecque (Paris: Vrin, 2008).
ous that Aristotle’s theory of being intended to fo-
cus on the former as opposed to the latter. It is 
probable that this affects the general meaning of 
the science of being qua being which is spoken of 
in Metaphysics Gamma 1 and Epsilon 1. 
2. Τὸ Ὄν in the Middle
Aristotle’s inquiry over being qua being is basi-
cally analogous to the methodological parts of his 
physics. Aristotle focuses on ὄν in the philosophi-
cal sense, which is Plato’s theory of principles as 
still practiced within the Academy and inherited 
from the pre-Socratic tradition especially from 
Parmenides. Now, there is no proof that either 
Parmenides, or Plato had an existing “something” 
in mind when dealing with τὸ ὄν. 
 As a matter of fact, when analysing the various 
uses of the verb “to be,” Aristotle seems mainly to 
deal with its copulative function, i.e., on its role as 
copula. I especially refer here to Aristotle’s doc-
trine of categories in the Metaphysics and to Meta-
physics Delta 7.
 But, whether Aristotle distinguishes this copu-
lative role as such and as opposed to different ones 
or not is an open issue in current literature.
 Texts of reference favourable towards the first 
option are rare. One of them is in Metaphysics Ep-
silon 1 (1025b16, 18, see also 1026a27). There Ar-
istotle distinguishes, while using the verb “to be,” 
two tasks and questions which must be dealt with, 
concerning any given subject for research: the εἰ 
ἔστι and the τί ἐστι. The εἰ ἔστι seems to be an 
absolute use of “to be,” i.e. (possibly) existence. 
Does it exist? Whereas the τί ἐστι, by contrast, is 
meant to express the actual content of it. And what 
it is? The two tasks share common features: one 
and the same inquiry deals with both issues alto-
gether. Both answers are susceptible to be de-
scribed through the relevant participle, τὸ ὄν. 
However, the two questions are dealt with by two 
kinds of assessments. These are clearly distin-
guished in the Organon, e.g., Posterior Analytics5 
5.  Arist. An. post. 89b32-5: (we seek) “if a centaur or a god 
is or is not (I mean if one is or not simpliciter and not if one 
is white or not). And knowing that it is, we seek what it is 
(e.g., so what is a god? or what is a man?).” Trans. J. Barnes, in 
The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Transla-
tion, vol. 1 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 42.
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is also indirectly opposed and postponed to Plato. 
By contrast, I would be glad to celebrate our Aris-
totelian jubilee while rescuing the fundamental 
validity of Aristotle’s perspective, which consum-
mates Plato’s theoretical experience on several re-
gards, keeping though a remarkable degree of in-
dependence.
 As I might say in a formula: Aristotle sought 
desperately for grammar, and for syntax especially. 
He aimed to grasp the definition of the verb “to 
be” when connected, on the one side to the sub-
ject, on the other, to the predicate. 
 I say “desperately” because no grammar in our 
sense, including syntax (as opposed to grammar as 
a mere writing and copying technique,) was avail-
able yet, neither would for a period after Aristotle. 
Indeed, Aristotle tried to grasp the role of human 
thought and language through the capacities and 
the potentiality of the verb “to be” and of its parti-
ciple, τὸ ὄν. However, even if he regarded the 
Greek usages of the participle “being” as a crucial 
issue, it seems that he still could not make out a 
fully coherent system out of it.
4.  A Few Interesting Anomalies 
and Aubenque’s Remark (2005)
Hence the interest of a series of samples, which did 
not attract attention so far and built the factual 
novelty of my present paper. They will deserve 
some attention in what follows, so to prompt some 
original interpretation of Aristotle’s understanding 
of the very participle of the verb “to be,” τὸ ὄν 
which he seems to refer not only to the subject but 
also to the predicate. This produces some interest-
ing anomalies in construction. 
 I refer for example to Lambda 4. 1070b25 and 7. 
1072a25f.
 In the first passage, manuscripts readings play a 
role. Unlike previous editors, we need to read this 
passage according to manuscripts of the so called 
α-family J and E (Vind. phl. Gr. 100 and Paris. gr. 
1853).12
12.  On the textual transmission and my proposed guide-
lines for a future critical edition, S. Fazzo, “Lo stemma codi-
cum della Metafisica di Aristotele,” Revue d’Histoire des Textes 
12 (2017): 35-58; Id., “Aristotle’s Metaphysics - Current Re-
search to Reconcile Two Branches of the Tradition,” Archiv für 
Geschichte der Philosophie 98/4 (2016): 433-457. 
 This must not be underestimated, especially in 
a time when no actual grammar rules were fixed 
yet. Aristotle sought for the definition of those im-
manent, albeit general rules, which lay at the basis 
of human thought and communication. This 
struggle of his led him to regard the participle of 
the verb “to be” as a key to predication in general 
(καθόλου, as Epsilon 1 says, 1026a24): by abstrac-
tion, Aristotle classifies the ways of predication as 
expressed by the different uses of the verb “to be,” 
and by their own classification.
3. The Role of Language Analysis
No one would deny that in the Metaphysics, the 
ways of being are then distinguished through lin-
guistic analysis. This is pretty obvious—other-
wise, they would not be called categories, i.e., 
types of predications.9 Moreover, as Metaphysics 
Delta shows, the analysis of “being” (τὸ ὄν) in 
chapter 7 clearly parallels the analysis of the dif-
ferent ways in which all considered terms are 
said. The key word is λέγεται, “it is said” (1017a7, 
18, 20, 22, 24).10 As in every good dictionary, the 
basis is the standard language. On this regard, 
Ackrill probably expresses a common view which 
also applies to the Metaphysics, when he remarks 
“Aristotle relies greatly on linguistic facts and 
tests, but his aim is to discover truths about non-
linguistic items.”11
 As common as the view can be, I find it unfair, 
because Aristotle is indirectly charged with a seri-
ous mistake. Accordingly, not without subtlety, he 
9.  I need to emphasize that my present remarks are not 
referred to the Categories as an Aristotelian work—whose au-
thenticity is by the way not unsuspected [by myself and by 
others, cf. M. Achard, “Tradition et histoire de l’aristotélisme. 
Le point de vue des indices externes dans le problème de 
l’authenticité du traité des Catégories,” Laval théologique et 
philosophique 56/2 (2000): 307-351; R. Bodéü s, Aristote: Caté-
gories, texte établi et traduit (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2001), 
esp. xc-cx]. As a result, my analysis is hardly compatible with 
those who seek to reconcile the underlying ontology at work 
there with the relevant parts of the Metaphysics. 
10.  Ross’ standard translation of λέγεται, “(it) means,” is flu-
ent, but not perfect (see the Oxford Translation [Aristotle’s 
Metaphysics, Oxford Classical Text (1924; Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1953)]. 
11.  J.L. Ackrill’s alleged reasons [Categories and De interpre-
tatione (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), 71] concerns Cate-
gories as a (supposed) Aristotelian treatise, see however note 
8 above.
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 Still, despite the centrality of the issue, it is dif-
ficult to find an interpretation of the Metaphysics 
where each occurrence of “being” (ὄν) – as the 
participle of the verb “to be” which plays there 
such a central role—is examined with such a pre-
grammatically-focussed perspective.
5.  Rhetoric Γ.5: 
Tὸ Ἑλληνίζειν at Stake
Concordance in endings is seen in Aristotle’s Rhet-
oric as a relevant part in the essence of ἑλληνίζειν, 
or “good Greek speaking.” At Rhetoric Γ 5. 1407b6-
11, concordance in gender and concordance in 
number are given as fourth and fifth of five re-
quirements for a correct Greek style. Sophists are 
counted among predecessors: Protagoras is ac-
knowledged with the distinction of feminine 
nouns as such. Actually, ending agreement in a 
sentence construction may appear to us an obvi-
ous requisite. 
 The striking fact is that in spite of his concerns, 
anomalies in inflexion are eventually found in Ar-
istotle’s use of the participle ὤν, οὖσα, ὄν. In the 
few passages seen above, Aristotle apparently gets 
gender concordances wrong, at least from our 
grammatical point of view. 
 Indeed, such anomalies have easily been nor-
malized by editors who revised the Greek text. If 
they survive textual criticism, they are labelled as 
constructio ad sensum. 
 Still, we may wonder: are those anomalies con-
traventions violations, or errors? Are not all these 
judgements affected by anachronism? 
 Thus we wish to focus on such peculiar features 
of a few sentences of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, try-
ing to make sense of them. Generally speaking, 
we know that there are two ways and reasons for 
violating the rules of agreement in classical lan-
guages: the inflexion is determined either by the 
closest noun, or by semantics, i.e., ad sensum. 
Both criteria apply to some of our case studies—
which is fair enough. However, this does not say 
anything about their deepest ratio, so some fur-
ther thoughts will not be superfluous. As we are 
about to see, our case is a special one since the 
contravention of what would be required by gram-
mar has its own positive weight in theoretical 
construction.
Aristotle speaks of the moving cause, and de-
scribes it as 
what produces movement or stillness, which is a 
king principle.
In Greek:
τὸ δ’ ὡς κινοῦν ἢ ἱστὰν ἀρχή τις οὖσα.
Note that the participle οὖσα is female, in agree-
ment with ἀρχή and not with the neuter subject. 
 I come now to my second example. We are at 
the conclusion of the main argument of the book, 
when Aristotle says:
“there is therefore something that moves with-
out being moved, which is eternal and is the 
substance and is in action.”
ἔστι τι ὃ οὐ κινούμενον κινεῖ, ἀΐδιον καὶ οὐσία 
καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ οὖσα.13
Once more, the participle οὖσα which is female, 
and is in agreement with a predicate, οὐσία, and 
not with the neuter subject.
 Such anomalies are not insignificant, as some 
further parallels will show (see below). They tes-
tify Aristotle’s focus on the predicate, and not only 
on the subject of the sentence.
 Conceptually speaking my reading is not un-
precedented. Its validation could reinforce a recent 
suggestion by Pierre Aubenque.14
 In Aubenque’s 2005 view, the participle (τὸ) ὄν, 
as it occurs in Aristotle’s Metaphysics, refers to the 
predicate rather than to the subject of the phrase. 
By contrast, such an interesting idea did not ap-
pear in Aubenque’s 1962 reference work.15 This 
fact suggests that Aubenque takes now into ac-
count several decades of reading experience on 
the Metaphysics. 
13.  I follow my own critical edition of this book: Il libro 
Lambda della Metafisica di Aristotele (Napoli: Bibliopolis, 
2012), ad loc. On ἐνεργείᾳ at 1072a25 as opposed to ἐνεργεῖα, 
printed by former editors, see my “Unmoved Mover as Pure 
Act or Unmoved Mover in Act? The Mystery of a Subscript 
Iota,” in Metaphysics Lambda - New Essays, ed. C. Horn (Bos-
ton-Berlin: De Gruyter, 2016), 181-205.
14.  See P. Aubenque, “La fonction de l’aporiae dans la Méta-
physique,” in La Métaphisique d’Aristote. Perspectives contempo-
raines, eds. M. Narcy and A. Tordesillas (Paris-Brussels: Vrin-
Ousia, 2005), 13.
15.  See P. Aubenque, Le problème de l’être chez Aristote (Pa-
ris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1962).
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7. Predicate as Being
Looking more closely, we wonder what is the rea-
son which allows to talk about predicate as being?
 We would possibly expect Aristotle to use an 
existential argument, like: if a man is white, white 
is because a white man is (i.e., white is inherent to 
a man, which exists). 
 However, this is exactly what Aristotle denies 
elsewhere: one cannot infer, from the premise that 
a chimera so coloured as snow is white, that such 
a chimera exists, nor that white exists for such a 
reason.
 After all, this is the overall sense of Aristotle’s 
argument, already at 1069a23f., when it says, 
otherwise, non-white would also exist.
The argument is clear enough so far. Already by 
Plato’s Academy negative qualities are a standard 
sample that no existence can be proved through 
predication. What is not obvious, within our 
standard way of talking about subject and verb, is 
the further, allegedly explanatory remark:
λέγομεν γοῦν εἶναι καὶ ταῦτα, 
οἷον ἔστιν οὐ λευκόν.
As a matter of fact, once more, Aristotle settles the 
being of the predicate based on language analysis. 
In English the above reads:
X is not-white, so in a sense, not-white is, i.e., 
not white can be regarded as being. 
The argument, if I take it well, applies whether X 
exists or not. What distinguishes the way of being 
of non white from the being of an existing sub-
stance does not depend on concreteness.18 It de-
pends on how the verb “to be” works within such 
a standard assessment as: 
X is Y.
Here, “is” (ἐστι) is related not only to X, on the 
one side, but also to Y on the other, so that Y as 
well can be spoken of as being. 
 So far we followed Lambda 1, where our stand-
ard distinction between subject and predicate seems 
to be ignored. It is not that Aristotle overlooked the 
18.  It is not as if one were to argue that I can paint and make 
white a wall which exists already and not one which never came 
to be, and does not exist yet.
 Still, the general phenomenon does not seem to 
affect any modern translation, nor to have attract-
ed attention so far. 
6. Looking at Metaphysics Lambda, ch. 1
This can be judged quoting from the onset of the 
book Lambda (1069a20-24):
 I propose the following translation:16
[…] and even in this way, substance is first, then 
there is quality, or quantity. But at the same time, 
these lattes are not even being in the full sense, 
but are qualities and movements [of substance]; 
otherwise, even the not-white and the not-
straight would be. Indeed, about such <predi-
cates>, we also say that they are, for example: “is 
not-white.”
The phrase contains, hidden as it is, a tricky and 
troublesome sentence, whose words are itali-
cized.17 This reads in Greek:
λέγομεν γοῦν εἶναι καὶ ταῦτα, 
οἷον ἔστιν οὐ λευκόν. 
How can this be held? Why predicates, such as 
“not-white,” are beings? 
 As dialectical as the point can be (it is an argu-
ment by modus tollens), how is it possible that 
when I say that something black is not white, I also 
claim that “not white” is? Elsewhere, as in the well-
known passages quoted above, Aristotle expressly 
denies that if X is Y, then X is. Here by contrast if 
X is, then Y somehow is as well. 
 There is a crucial grammatical issue inside this 
phrase, which is usually overlooked in textual ex-
egesis. Indeed, the main issue is clear at any rate: 
substance is prior among beings. However, there is 
a problem concerning the logical connection of 
ταῦτα with the verb “to be” (εἶναι). Aristotle does 
not appear to distinguish sharply whether ταῦτα is 
the subject, or the predicate noun of εἶναι instead. 
16.  Ross’ translation (op.cit.) is different here, partly because 
of a different critical text at 1069a21; see contra already M. 
Frede, “Metaphysics Λ.1,” in Aristotle’s Metaphysics Lambda. 
Symposium Aristotelicum (Oxford, August 26-30, 1996), eds. 
Michael Frede and David Charles (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
2000), 53-80, ad loc.
17.  The sentence is tricky because “not-white” is the predi-
cate, not the subject; Ross’ Oxford Translation (op.cit.) “there 
is a not-white,” is not literal enough.
–  –
SILVIA FAZZO “BEING” (ΤO OΝ)  ΑS SAID OF PREDIC ATES IN THE CRITIC AL TEXT OF ARISTOTLE, METAPHYSICS LAMBDA
 Aristotle sought for grammar as an internal law 
and system for human language and thought. He 
invented the core of the metaphysics. 
problem or did not get interested in it; on the con-
trary, he did spend special attention to it in different 
contexts and made a big deal of it. For this purpose 
he settles his “science of being qua being.”
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